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ORIGINALITY REQUIREMENT IN REPRODUCTIONS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN
WORKS
L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder
In implementing the constitutional directive to promote the
arts and sciences,' Congress has extended the protection granted an
author under the Copyright Act to encompass reproductions of
works of art.2 Before an individual may secure this protection, how-
ever, it must be shown that the reproduction is in some way origi-
nal.' Although an exact definition of this criterion has proved trou-
I The Constitution provides that "Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Prog-
ress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2 17 U.S.C. 99 1-216 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The first copyright legislation enacted by
Congress protected only books, maps, and charts. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
Additional material was added to the statutory list during the following century. See Act of
April 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171 (prints); Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436
(musical compositons); Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (dramatic compositions);
Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540 (photographs and negatives); Act of July 8, 1870,
ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198 (paintings, drawings, chromos, statuettes, statuary, and models or
designs intended as works of fine art).
The copyright laws were substantially revised in 1909. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320,
35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). This revision
included the extention of copyright protection to reproductions of works of art. 17 U.S.C. §
5(h) (1970). For an outline of the history of copyright legislation in the United States, see
Staff Members of the New York University Law Review Under the Guidance of Prof. Walter
J. Derenberg, The Meaning of "Writings" in the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, in 1
STUDIES ON COPYRIHT 50-61 (Arthur Fisher Mem. ed. 1963). The basic protections granted
to authors of copyrighted works are contained in 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) which provides that
"[any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall have
the exclusive right . . . [t]o print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work."
Id. § 101 provides that any person who infringes on another's copyright may be enjoined and
is subject to an award of profits, impoundment, and destruction of his infringing material.
In 1976 Congress overwhelmingly passed the first general revision of the copyright law
since 1909. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (effective Jan. 1, 1978) (codified at 17
U.S.C.A. 99 101-810 (Supp. 1976)). See House Passage: Copyright Law Revision, 34 CONG.
Q. 2638 (1976); Senate Passage: Copyright Law Revision, 34 CONG. Q. 482 (1976).
3 The statutory basis for copyrighting reproductions is found in § 5 of the Copyright Act.
While it is clear that a work of art may be copyrighted, 17 U.S.C. § 51g) (1970), and an author
has the exclusive right to "copy" his own copyrighted work, id. § 1(a), the Copyright Act also
provides for the copyrighting of "[r]eproductions of a work of art," id. § 5(h).
It is no simple task to define what is meant by the terms found in § 5 of the Copyright
Act. Professor Melville B. Nimmer, the leading authority in the copyright field, devotes two
entire sections of his treatise to the two requirements that a reproduction of a work of art
must possess-an underlying work of art. 1 M. NfMmER, COPYRGHT § 20.1 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as NIMMER], and originality, id. § 20.2. Since, as Professor Nimm'er has noted, a
reproduction of a work of art must contain an underlying work of art, id. § 20.1, it would be
appropriate to examine the requirements that an underlying work must possess. To qualify
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blesome, it is clear that copying, without more, does not fulfill the
originality requirement.' With the advent of modern mass produc-
tion techniques and the concomitant simplification of the means of
reproduction,' delineating the degree of originality necessary to
as a work of art a piece must evince a minimal level of creativity, a quality that relates to
the nature of the work itself. See id. § 19.1. In other words, the work must have a level of
"creative authorship in its delineation or form." 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) (1976). The Supreme
Court has expressed the view that only a slight degree of creativity is required. Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). Justice Holmes, writing for the Bleistein
Court, did not wish to place judges in the position of art critics lest, due to the inexactitude
of a judicial process involving personal tastes, public access to new trends in the art would
be frustrated. Id. at 251-52.
The requirement of creativity cannot apply, however, to a reproduction of a work of art
because, as a reproduction, it must be based upon a work of art that has previously been
"created." It has been stated that a requirement of creativity is "self-contradictory" where
reproductions are concerned since "[tihat element . . . is supplied by the basic underlying
work." L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 187 U.S.P.Q. 721, 729 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds en bane, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 156 (1976); see notes 16-17
and accompanying text infra. Both works of art and reproductions of works of art, however,
require a degree of originality, a contribution by the author to the work. See M. NICHOLSON,
A MANUAL OF COPYRIGHT PRACTICE 54 (2d ed. 1956); NIMMER, supra, §§ 19.2, 20.2. No precise
definition of originality may be postulated. With regard to reproductions, it is an ephemeral
standard that must be based on a comparison with the underlying work. See Alfred Bell &
Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951), modifying and aff'g 74 F. Supp.
973 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), which required a "'distinguishable variation'" from the preexisting
work, 191 F.2d at 102, quoting Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morrison & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159,
161 (2d Cir. 1927), and a contribution of "something more than a 'merely trivial' variation"
by the author or artist. 191 F.2d at 103, quoting Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 159 F.2d
512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945). For a discussion of Alfred Bell, see notes 22-24 and accompanying
text infra. An alternative approach has been used in at least one case holding that reproduc-
tion of a work reduced in scale using "great skill" and "exactitude" amounts to a level of
originality sufficient to satisfy the originality requirement. See Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winnin-
ger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). For a discussion of Alva Studios, see notes 26-29
and accompanying text infra.
It should be noted that while the requirements for works of art and reproductions of works
of art are different, an artist will not be penalized in any way for an error in classification in
the copyright application. 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970); see, e.g., Soptra Fabrics Corp. v. Stafford
Knitting Mills, Inc., 490 F.2d 1092, 1094 (2d Cir. 1974).
NIMMER, supra note 3, § 20.2.
See generally Note, Constitutional Limits on Copyright Protection, 68 HAv. L. REV.
517 (1955); Comment, Copyright Protection for Mass-Produced, Commercial Products: A
Review of the Developments Following Mazer v. Stein, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 807 (1971). For
example, photocopying of copyrighted works is a practice presently prevalent in our society.
It is estimated that the approximately 600,000 photocopiers in use in the United States today
which are capable of reproducing drawings and other works of art produce 30 billion copies a
year. II N. HENRY, COPYRIGHT-INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY-PUBLIC POLICY 2 (1976). This ob-
viously has created numerous problems in the publishing field with regard to royalties, loss
of sales and subscriptions, declining sales of back issues and reprints, and loss of advertising
revenues. See W. NASRI, CRISIS IN COPYRIGHT (1976).
For other examples of two- and three dimensional articles that have been mass-
reproduced commercially due to advanced industrial processes, see Soptra Fabrics Corp. v.
Stafford Knitting Mills, Inc., 490 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir.1974) (work of art transferred onto cloth);
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bring a reproduction within the ambit of the Copyright Act has been
further complicated. Specifically, the question has arisen whether
the reproduction in a different medium of a public domain' work of
art is sufficiently original in itself to warrant copyright protection.
In L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder,7 the Second Circuit, sitting en
banc, held that the reproduction of a public domain toy bank in a
different medium, with only minor variations, is not sufficiently
original to warrant copyright protection.'
Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970) (work of art used on
a greeting card); Millworth Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1960) (work of
art reexpressed in a dress fabric design); Cynthia Designs, Inc. v. Robert Zentall, Inc., 416
F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (small silver pendant shaped to resemble a T-shirt); Gardenia
Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (traditional flower
corsage arrangements composed of artificial flowers); Barton Candy Corp. v. Tell Chocolate
Novelties Corp., 178 F. Supp. 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) (Christmas motif greeting card designed
as a container for chocolate).
6 For copyright purposes, the "public domain" is a status into which falls all unprotected
works that have been made available to the community at large. See generally M. NICHOLSON,
A MANUAL OF COPYRIGHT PRACrICE 147 (2d ed. 1956). A work of art may enter the public
domain for any one of a number of reasons, including failure to properly register for a copy-
right by not following the procedures set out in 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-32 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) or
expiration coupled with a failure to renew pursuant to id. § 24. Cf. Letter Edged in Black
Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 320 F. Supp. 1303 (N.D. Ill. 1970), wherein a monumental
sculpture could not be copyrighted because the model on which it was based had been placed
in the public domain when it was shown to the press after recognition that its sculptor, Pablo
Picasso, was to donate the monument to the people of Chicago.
Once a work is in the public domain, it is "free to anybody's use. . . .Any member of
the public would therefore have an equal right to make an independent adaption, arrange-
ment, etc., of such original works as are in the public domain." H. HowELL, THE COPYuIGHT
LAW 42 (3d ed. 1952). Section 8 of the Copyright Act, guaranteeing these public rights,
provides that "no copyright shall subsist in the original text of any work which is in the public
domain," 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added). To provide for reproduction
copyrights, however, § 7 of the Copyright Act provides that "versions of works in the public
domain . . . shall be regarded as new works subject to copyright under the provisions of this
title." Id. § 7 (emphasis added); see id. § 5(h) (copyright protection extended to reproductions
of works of art).
1 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 156 (1976), rev'g 187 U.S.P.Q.
721 (2d Cir.), af'g 394 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
1 536 F.2d at 492. The new law, to go into effect on January 1, 1978, should not change
the judicially determined limitations on the subject matter of copyrights affirmed in Batlin.
See Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2598 (1976) (effective Jan. 1, 1978) (codified at 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 102 (Supp. 4 1976)). The new statute neither refers to reproductions of works of art nor the
public domain per se; it does, however, state in § 103 of the transitional and supplementary
provisions that "the Act does not provide copyright protection for any work that goes into
the public domain before January 1, 1978." 90 Stat. at 2599. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 180 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6089, 6226.
Provision is made for the protection of derivative works employing preexisting material. 17
U.S.C.A. § 103 (Supp. 4 1976). This section is apparently intended to replace those concepts.
In fact, the definition of a derivative work states that it "is a work based on [a] preexisting
[work], such as a[n] .. .art reproduction .. .or any other form in which a work may be
recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (Supp. 4 1976). It must be assumed that
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:349
The reproduction involved in Batlin was a nine-inch plastic
"Uncle Sam Mechanical Bank" produced in Hong Kong by the
defendant Snyder. Snyder's sculptor had produced the mold using
as a model an eleven-inch cast iron bank originally produced in the
United States in the late 1800's.9 The metal bank had entered the
public domain upon expiration of its design patent sometime prior
to the 1909 copyright law revision.'" In addition to the two-inch
height differential, the plastic version varied slightly from the origi-
nal in such areas as the width of the base on which "Uncle Sam"
stood and the design work on both the figure and base. Design
requirements of the single-mold method of production resulted in
these differences in Snyder's plastic version." Although the medium
was dissimilar, the essential design work and function of the bank
remained the same-an Uncle Sam figure dropping a coin into a
carpetbag when a lever was depressed. 2
Due to Snyder's copyright registration, the United States Cus-
toms Service prevented Batlin, a novelty merchant, from importing
an identical plastic bank from the Orient. 3 Consequently, Batlin
sought an injunction in the Southern District of New York to compel
cancellation of Snyder's copyright. District Judge Metzner granted
the injunction," foreseeing little probability that Snyder's copyright
preexisting material without a valid copyright in effect is equivalent to the notion of the
public domain.
I A design patent (No. 16,728) was granted on the metal toy savings bank on June 8,
1886. 536 F.2d at 488.
10 187 U.S.P.Q. at 723. This bank, itself, could not be copyrighted again because of the
provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1970). See note 6 supra.
" For a list of the variations between the plastic and metal versions of the bank, see note
37 infra.
12 536 F.2d at 488.
13 19 C.F.R. § 133.42(c) (1976) grants a United States Customs Service district director
the power to "seize and forfeit an imported article which he determines constitutes a piratical
copy of a recorded copyrighted work."
" 394 F. Supp. at 1390. It has been stated that in a copyright case:
[Oince a prima facie case of infringement has been made out, a preliminary
injunction should issue, even in the absence of a detailed showing of irreparable
injury. . . since "a copyright holder in the ordinary case may be presumed to suffer
irreparable harm when his right to the exclusive use of the copyrighted material is
invaded."
Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. Sperber, 457 F.2d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1972), quoting American
Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 389 F.2d 903, 905 (2d Cir. 1968).
This standard was formulated to apply to copyright holders seeking protection from infrin-
gers, whereas in Batlin it was the alleged infringer who was seeking an injunction to compel
cancellation of the copyright. For the copyright holder to prevent such action, he must come
forward with sufficient evidence to show the existence of a valid copyright. In Batlin, Judge
Metzner held that Snyder failed to make his prima facie case and found "little probability
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would be found valid at a trial on the merits. It was Judge Metzner's
opinion that the artistic skill employed by Snyder's sculptor did not
contribute anything "more than a 'merely trivial variation"' 5 to the
original work. Upon appeal, Judge Meskill, writing for the majority
of the three-judge appellate panel, reversed the grant of the injunc-
tion."6 He found the "originality of process" utilized in transferring
the cast iron bank to the plastic medium sufficient to satisfy the
burden of establishing copyrightability.Y7
On rehearing, however, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc,
reinstated the preliminary injunction granted by the district court. 8
In an opinion authored by Judge Oakes, who had dissented from the
initial appellate decision, 9 the en banc Batlin court emphasized
that originality is the key factor in determining whether a reproduc-
tion of a public domain expression is copyrightable. 0 According to
that defendants' copyright [would] be found valid in a trial on the merits." 394 F. Supp. at
1390.
IS The requirement of more than a merely trivial variation in cases where public domain
works have been reproduced was incorporated from the leading court of appeals case in this
area, Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951), modifying and
af'g 74 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), discussed in notes 22-24 and accompanying text infra.
It should be noted that Judge Metzner had initially formed his opinion on the non-
copyrightability of this particular bank in a similar action, Etna Products Co. v. E. Mishan
& Sons, No. 75-428 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). That case was held in abeyance pending the final
outcome of the Batlin appeals. 187 U.S.P.Q. at 723 n.3.
26 187 U.S.P.Q. at 729.
'7 Id. The original appellate decision held that the required originality for a reproduction
was satisfied by the fact that Snyder's "sculptor needed special skill, training and knowledge,
and independent judgment to create the mold." Id. No reference was made to whether the
bank satisfied the "trivial variation" test of Alfred Bell, which, as the original dissent noted,
"is the heart of the originality requirement." Id. at 730 (Oakes, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original). The majority's "novel conclusion" was to be reversed upon rehearing en banc and
was even abandoned by Judge Meskill in his dissent therein. See text accompanying note 46
infra.
" 536 F.2d 486, 492.
, In the original decision by the Second Circuit, Judge Oakes forcefully dissented,
noting:
The majority opinion rendered today eviscerates this circuit's line of cases requiring
a modicum of originality for copyrightability and in doing so opens the door to
copyrights for slavish copies of any object in the public domain. Incidentally to
doing so the majority also totally disregards the substantial evidence supporting
Judge Metzner's findings that the likelihood that appellants can show any input
of originality to justify their copyright is small since change of material and change
in size do not alone render an object copyrightable. The majority opinion cheapens
copyrights... by making them meaningless ....
187 U.S.P.Q. at 730 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
" 536 F.2d at 492. The court conceded that although "the test of 'originality' may leave
a lot to be desired, . . . it is the only one we have. . . . Here as elsewhere in the copyright
law there are lines that must be drawn even though reasonable men may differ where." Id.
(citation omitted). See NiMMER, supra note 3, § 20.2.
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the Batlin court, for a work to qualify for copyright protection, it is
necessary that the author contribute "at least some substantial var-
iation, not merely a trivial variation such as might occur in the
translation to a different medium."'21
This standard was first delineated in an oft-cited decision,
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.2  In Alfred Bell, public
domain paintings by the "old masters" were hand reproduced by
engravers into mezzotints with sufficient variation to be considered
copyrightable by the Second Circuit.23 It is true that, as in Batlin,
the engraver expressed the original in another medium, but since
each mezzotint required separate hand inking the court believed
that a distinguishable effect, although modest, did result, and this
entitled the works to protection.24 Applying this originality test, the
en banc Batlin court refused to hold copyrightable what it termed
"miniscule variations" in a work where there exists no "genuine
"1 536 F.2d at 491.
22 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951), modifying and af'g 74 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
Premonitions of the Alfred Bell originality test can be seen as early as 1927. In that year,
the Second Circuit noted that a painting of subject matter in the public domain would
not support a copyright unless there was "distinguishable variation" present. See Gerlach-
Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien, Inc., 23 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1927), wherein it was held that
although plaintiff's painting of a scene from nature entitled "Song of the Bluebird" was
similar to a public domain picture entitled "Spring Song," it contained sufficient variation
to be the subject of a copyright. In 1945, another Second Circuit opinion noted that "the
Constitution does not authorize. . . a monopoly grant to one whose product lacks all creative
originality." Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945). There, it
was held that because part of plaintiff's version of the rules and board for the game "Acey-
Ducey" lacked originality, the portion of plaintiff's copyright covering those aspects of the
game was ineffective. The plaintiff had copied them from rules and an object in the public
domain. The court did not consider it relevant that plaintiff's board contained slight distinc-
tions from the original.
2 191 F.2d at 104.
2, Id. at 102. Alfred Bell concerned an infringement action brought by the producer of
eight mezzotint engravings of public domain works by the "old masters." Deciding that all
that was necessary to uphold a copyright of the mezzotints was a "distinguishable variation"
from the public domain paintings, the Alfred Bell court held that the mezzotints were indeed
sufficiently "original." Although the Alfred Bell district court noted that "[tihe artists
employed to produce [the] mezzotint engravings . . . attempted faithfully to reproduce
paintings in the mezzotint medium so that the basic idea, arrangement, and color scheme
. . . [were] those of the original artist," sufficient originality was found in that the work of
the engraver was an expensive, "tedious process requiring skill and patience." 74 F. Supp.
at 975. The Second Circuit, however, did not rely on the author's skill or the expense of the
process involved. Instead, it articulated the following test: "All that is needed to satisfy both
the Constitution and the statute is that the 'author' contributed something more than a
'merely trivial' variation, something recognizably 'his own'. Originality in this context 'means
little more than a prohibition of actual copying."' 191 F.2d at 102-03. (footnotes omitted),
citing Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1945), and Hoague-Spraugue
Corp. v. Frank C. Meyer Co., 31 F.2d 583, 586 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
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difference between the underlying work of art and the copy of it for
which protection is sought."
Finding the bank insufficiently original to satisfy the Alfred
Bell test, the court turned to an analysis based upon a test which
recognizes that originality occasionally may be expressed in a re-
production absent any distinguishable variation other than size. In
Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger,2 a copyright was sustained where
the work reproduced was identical to the original, but had been
reduced in size through the effort of highly skilled artisans.Y The
public domain work of art in Alva Studios, Rodin's "Hand of God,"
a highly acclaimed statue on permanent display in a museum, was
reproduced in minute detail in a one-half scale model approved by
the museum and sold to the public. Noting that it had taken "'an
extremely skilled sculptor' many hours working directly in front of
the original" 2 to produce the copy, the Alva Studios court upheld
the copyright because of the "great skill and originality. . . called
for . . . to produce a scale reduction of a great work with exacti-
tude.,' 21
Although recognizing the viability of the Alva Studios standard
whereby "sheer artistic skill and effort can act as a substitute for
the requirement of substantial variation,"3 the en banc Batlin court
emphatically held that Snyder's sculptor, who had produced his
mold in less than two days, had not exhibited the degree of skill and
effort necessary to satisfy this test.3 1
Clearly, the basic issue in all phases of the Batlin litigation was
21 536 F.2d at 492. The en banc majority listed a number of variations which Snyder
contended were present in his work. The variations were in "very minute details," many of
which were "not perceptible to the casual observer." Many of the changes listed were a result
of the differences in the texture of the respective materials used; others were caused by the
fact that a single mold was used for the plastic version. The court also set forth a partial list
of major similarities, including the attire of Uncle Sam, his pose, the color scheme, and the
method in which the carpetbag opened. Id. at 489.
' 177 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
Id. at 266.
"Id.
29 Id. at 267.
Id. at 266.
" 536 F.2d at 492. In Millworth Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443, 444 (2d Cir.
1960), it took the plaintiff's stylist "some months to develop an arrangement of varying
colors" to qualify the reproduction of a design in fabric as a copyrightable work. Similarly,
in Alva Studios it took 'an extremely skilled sculptor' many hours working directly in front
of the original" to achieve exactitude in the reduction. 177 F. Supp. at 266. It should also be
noted that the Alfred Bell district court placed heavy emphasis on the "tedious process
requiring skill and patience" involved in producing the mezzotints containing the substantial
variation. 74 F. Supp. at 975.
1977]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
whether either one or both of these standards was achieved by Sny-
der's bank.32 While noting that the threshold requirement of origi-
nality is minimal and that a mass produced reproduction is capable
of supporting an independent copyright, the en banc panel held that
something more than a de facto copying of a public domain article
is required.13 Some quantum of originality, some creative addition
or substantial variation over and above the independent effort ex-
pended for the minor variations which inadvertently occur as a re-
sult of the production of the mold, was required by the Batlin
court.34 Consequently, the Second Circuit concluded that the dis-
trict court judge had not abused his discretion by granting Batlin
the injunction, for Snyder's "copyrighted" bank was not, in fact,
worthy of copyright protection. 5
Although it is conceded that when Snyder's bank is viewed in
terms of the variation and skilled reduction standards for determin-
ing originality, it exhibits elements of both, it is submitted that the
Batlin court was correct in finding that the degree of either was not
sufficient to raise the bank to a copyrightable status. When com-
pared to the Alfred Bell mezzotint engravers who added distinguish-
able variations to their finished artistic works, Snyder's sculptor
added only trivial variations. As for the Alva Studios standard,
although Snyder's sculptor did require some skill to create the mold,
the necessary ability fell far short of the "true artistic skill" exem-
plified in the reduction of Rodin's intricate work .3 Thus, although
Snyder's bank contained elements of both criteria, it did not display
the degree of originality required by either test to secure copyright
status.
In contrast to the majority's conclusion, the en banc dissent
believed that the variations found in the plastic version were indeed
32 Compare the en banc majority's characterization of the facts, see note 25 supra, with
that of the dissent, see note 37 infra. In the district court decision, Judge Metzner did not
find an Alfred Bell distinctive variation and distinguished Alva Studios on the basis of the
lack of "complexity" in Snyder's work. He specifically rebuked the defendant for claiming
substantial differences under the Alfred Bell test while also trying to bring the plastic bank
under the umbrella of the exactitude test of Alva Studios. 394 F. Supp. at 1390-91.
33 536 F.2d at 490-91.
11 Id. at 492.
35 Id.
3' The Batlin en banc majority noted that, "the plastic version is not, and was scarcely
meticulously produced to be, an exactly faithful reproduction. Nor is the creativity in the
underlying work of art the same order of magnitude as in the case of the 'Hand of God.'" Id.
at 492. Similarly, in Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc., v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 320 F. Supp.
1303, 1310 (N.D. Ill. 1970), a "mere copy" coupled with a change in size, "albeit on a grand
scale," could not qualify a monumental sculpture for a copyright.
[Vol. 51:349
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more than trivial 7.3 Thus, Judge Meskill, author of both the original
majority opinion and the en banc dissent, concluded that Judge
Metzner had abused his discretion 8 in finding that the copyright
could not be supported at a trial on the merits."
It would appear that in reaching this conclusion, the dissent
was more concerned with public policy considerations" than with
11 536 F.2d at 492. The dissent maximized the differences between the two banks, stating:
The primary variations between the two banks involve height; medium; anatomical
proportions of the Uncle Sam figure, including shape and expression of face; design
of the clothing (hat, tie, shirt, collar, trousers); detail around the eagle figure on
the platform; placement of the umbrella; and the shape and texture of the satchel.
536 F.2d at 493 (Meskill, J., dissenting). The majority couched its explanation of the differ-
ences in terms of "minute details." Id. at 489 (Oakes, J.); see note 26 supra.
I Since the grant of a preliminary injunction is a matter of discretion for the trial court,
Perry v. Perry, 190 F.2d 601, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1951), a reversal would be warranted upon an
abuse of that discretion in a copyright infringement case. See Ideal Toy Corp. v. Sayco Doll
Corp., 302 F.2d 623, 624 (2d Cir. 1962). A finding that a district court judge abused his
discretion is not extraordinary in itself, and is proper where the reviewing "panel has the same
record and no part of the decision below turned on credibility." 536 F.2d at 493 (Meskill, J.,
dissenting). The original appellate opinion in Batlin, however, was a reversal of a particularly
strong opinion, one in which the district court concluded that the 'differences [were] so
infinitesimal [that] they make no difference."' Id. at 489 (Oakes, J.).
3' 536 F.2d at 493 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
,0 In reaching its decision, the en banc majority specifically declined to follow a Ninth
Circuit case, Sunset House Distributing Corp. v. Doran, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962), af'g
197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal. 1961). In Doran, a case with strong public policy overtones, the
copyright for a three-dimensional plastic Santa Claus was upheld. The Santa Claus figure,
which was sold as an ornament, consisted of two plastic bags that could be filled with
newspaper and assembled, using accompanying ornamentation, to depict a five and one-half
foot figure. 197 F. Supp. at 942. The district court questioned only the originality of the
"medium of expression" in determining that the Santa Claus figure met the "modest" re-
quirement. It was held that the author was "contributing something 'recognizably his own'
to prior treatments of the same subject," and that the "Santa is 'original' because of its form
and medium . . . ." Id. at 944-45. Professor Nimmer has labelled the Doran and original
appellate level Batlin decisions "ludicrous" for suggesting that "the first person to execute a
public domain work of art in a different medium" achieves something copyrightable "for the
reason that no one can claim to have independently evolved any particular medium."
NIMMER, supra note 3, § 20.2, at 94 (1976 & Supp. June 1976) (footnote omitted).
The apparent direct conflict between the Ninth and Second Circuits becomes less signifi-
cant upon an examination of the factual situations in each case. On their faces, both seem
to concern public domain "personages" transferred into plastic and mass-produced for com-
sumption during specific time periods (Christmas and the Bicentennial). While the concepts
of Santa Claus and Uncle Sam are indisputably in the public domain, it is eminently clear
that manifestations of these concepts are open to protection as works of art if the prescribed
degrees of originality and creativity are met. See note 3 supra. Doran met this test while
Batlin could only hope to qualify as a reproduction of a previously existing work.
As background to a determination of the efficacy of the Doran work, it is important to
consider the universally recognized principle that a copyright is the protection of the
expression of an idea, as opposed to a patent which protects the inventor's idea itself. See
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954). This theory was initially given credence in 1884 when
the Supreme Court noted that the term "writings" in the Constitution section enabling
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the specific factual issues present before the court." It was the opin-
ion of Judge Meskill that the refusal to recognize Snyder's copyright
would serve only to defeat a valid purpose, viz., that of securing
"protection from someone using Snyder's figurine to slavishly copy
and make a mold."4 While a natural disinclination exists towards
a manufacturer such as Batlin, a competing businessman who
learns of a new product and seeks to derive a share of the expected
profits, judicial attempts to prevent this form of business practice
should not include finding that the copyright in question is valid
regardless of whether it satisfies the Alfred Bell and Alva Studios
standards. Protection of the increments added by Snyder would
have avoided allowing Batlin to reap the benefits of what was essen-
tially Snyder's commercial idea. 3 Commercial ideas such as the one
in Batlin, however, are not provided for in the statutory framework
of copyright laws." Rather, it is the physical expressions of ideas
copyright legislation, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, "meant the literary productions of. . .authors,
and Congress very properly has declared these to include all forms of writing, printing,
engraving, etching, etc., by which the ideas in the mind of the author are given visible
expression." Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884). See Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101-03 (1879); Uneeda Doll Co. v. P & M Doll Co., 353 F.2d 788, 789
(2d Cir. 1965) (per curiam); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487,
489 (2d Cir. 1960); Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776, 783
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). It can be readily seen that in accordance with the above principle, the Doran
"Santa Claus" was an expression of an idea while "Uncle Sam" was merely an expression of
another expression.
In sum, while policy considerations were relied on heavily by the Ninth Circuit in affirm-
ing Doran, see 304 F.2d at 252, such factors did not have to be determinative of the decision.
The Santa Claus figure was sufficiently original to qualify on the merits as a work of art based
on a public domain idea and not as a reproduction. 197 F. Supp. at 944-45. As the district
court noted, the plaintiffs in Doran "envisioned, and then created by their own skill, labor
and judgment" the subject piece. Id. at 944. The inherent difference in the Batlin case is the
prior existence of the exact same expression in the public domain. Once an expression has
been manifested and copyrighted, it is protected until the copyright's expiration. Once ex-
pired, it may not be protected again.
1' While the district court and en banc majority were chided for basing their decisions
on "[aifter the fact speculation as to whether Snyder made changes for aesthetic or func-
tional reasons," 536 F.2d at 493 (Meskill, J., dissenting), the dissent was guilty of a similar
transgression. After the fact speculation concerning whether an idea will be copied by another
manufacturer should not enter into the determination of whether an object meets the stan-
dard of originality required of reproductions of public domain works. The question whether
a work deserves copyright protection should be determined strictly on the merits.
42 Id. at 494 (emphasis added).
" Batlin's defense to these charges was based on his claim that he had ordered cast iron
copies of the bank as early as August 9, 1974. When he thereafter became aware of what he
considered 'an almost identical copy' of the cast iron bank," he decided to order his own
plastic version. Id. at 488 (Oakes, J.).
" See 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Ideas are to be protected under the Patent
Law, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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that copyrights are designed to protect.4 5
A further indication of public policy considerations underlying
the dissent is the complete retreat by Judge Meskill from the
"originality of process" theory he had propounded in his original
majority opinion." His utilization in the en banc dissent of a totally
new approach based on the claim that the variations were not, in
fact, minimal, may signal a desire to prevent on any ground avail-
able the type of practice engaged in by Batlin.
Certainly policy considerations were present in both Alfred Bell
and Alva Studios. In Alfred Bell, the district court condemned the
defendants for "us[ing] proofs taken from the plaintiff's plates and
sold by the plaintiff, carrying notice of plaintiff's copyright, as the
subjects of their colored photoengravings."Il In Alva Studios, there
was "convincing credible evidence to establish actual copying" of
the plaintiff's work. 8 Such charges are clearly inherent in all copy-
right infringement actions. In addition, according to the Batlin en
banc majority, the policy aspects of Alva Studios included a desire
on the part of that court to increase public access to fine works of
art,49 a factor absent in Batlin5 0 These policy considerations, how-
ever, were not determinative. The Alfred Bell and Alva Studios
works were independently supported by sufficient originality,
whereas the Batlin work was not.
Where a work simply does not warrant protection on its merits,
general policy aspects should not dictate copyright determinations.
Such an "amorphous, far-reaching principle"5 could serve to dis-
rupt the already minimal copyright standards applicable to works
, See note 40 supra.
,8 187 U.S.P.Q. at 729.
,7 74 F. Supp. at 977.
' 177 F. Supp. at 268.
" 536 F.2d at 492. No mention of increasing public access to the Rodin sculpture was
made in the Alva Studios decision.
"' While referring to the public policy "access" aspects of the Alva Studios decision, the
Batlin en banc majority noted with particularity the skill and exactitude necessary to make
that reproduction:
Rodin's sculpture is. . . so unique and rare, and adequate public access to it such
a problem that a significant public benefit accrues from its precise, artistic repro-
duction. No such benefit can be imagined to accrue here from the "knock-off"
reproduction of the cast iron Uncle Sam bank. Thus appellants' plastic bank is
neither in the category of exactitude required by Alva Studios nor in a category of
substantial originality; it falls within what has been suggested. . . is a copyright
no-man's land.
Id.
" Comment, Copyright Protection for Mass-Produced, Commercial Products: A Review
of the Developments Following Mazer v. Stein, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 807, 821 (1971).
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of art and their reproductions. Despite the policy aspects of the
Alfred Bell and Alva Studios decisions, there was present in both
subject works a substantial amount of originality. Whether one con-
siders the originality of process used to create Snyder's bank or the
originality of the variations created, it seems obvious that the bank
did not possess the requisite originality to merit protection. Sny-
der's bank was copied directly from a prior public domain expres-
sion of an idea, and did not meet even the minimal originality
requirements previously established to protect public access to
items belonging to the national culture.2
If copyright protection for Snyder's bank had been sustained,
public access to the object would have been severely limited. Allow-
ing a manufacturer who adds little or nothing to a design to copy
and then copyright it would conceivably provide an opportunity for
unscrupulous producers to gain control over public domain works
through utilization of different medium originality.53 The Batlin
court's affirmance of the "trivial variation" test and refusal to
equate process originality with the traditonal definitions of original-
ity creates a strong precedent that, hopefully, will serve to preserve
public access to public domain articles.
Steven L. Young
52 The raison d'etre of copyright is not only to ensure profit for authors. As Professor
Nimmer has stated:
The primary purpose of copyright is not to reward the author, but is rather to secure
"the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors."
Thus the authorization to grant to individual authors the limited monopoly of
copyright is predicated upon the dual premises that the public benefits from the
creative activities of authors, and that the copyright monopoly is a necessary condi-
tion to the full realization of such creative activities. Implicit in this rationale is
the assumption that in the absence of such public benefit the grant of a copyright
monopoly to individuals would be unjustified.
NIMMER, supra note 3, § 3.1, at 6.6 (footnote omitted).
u 536 F.2d at 492.
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